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CORPORATIONS-STOCK TRANSFER-ENFORCEABILITY OF REsTRICTIONS ON 
RIGHT OF TRANSFER WHEN NoT STATED ON CERTIFICATE-A by-Iaw1 of de-
fendant corporation provided tllat no stockholder could sell his shares 
unless he first offered them for sale to the corporation or its directors. 
The by-law also stated that this restriction should be printed on the stock 
certificates and would thereupon bind all present or future owners or 
holders. The corporation never complied with this latter provision. Plain-
tiff, having knowledge of the by-law restriction, purchased two shares of 
the corporation's stock, but these shares were not first offered for sale to the 
corporation or its directors. When the corporation refused to transfer 
the shares, plaintiff sued to compel a transfer and the issuance of new 
certificates to him. The equity court granted the requested relief. On 
appeal, held, affirmed. Under the terms of the by-law and the requirements 
of section 15 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act,2 such a restriction is 
not enforceable, even against one who has actual knowledge, unless 
stated on the stock certificate. Jiopwood v. Topsham Telephone Co., 
(Vt. 1957) 132 A. (2d) 170. 
Section 15 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act has ·been adopted in 
all but three states.s Under its provisions, a number of cases have arisen 
in which an attempt was made to enforce restrictions on sale against per-
sons who had actual knowledge of the restrictions, even though not 
printed on the certificate.4 In two early cases,5 where the offending parties 
1 Principal case at 171. 
2 "There shall be no lien in favor of a corporation upon the shares represented by 
a certificate issued by such corporation and there shall be no restriction upon the transfer 
of shares so represented by virtue of any by-laws of such corporation, or othenvise, unless 
the right of the corporation to such lien or the restriction is stated upon the certificate.'' 
Vt. Stat. (1947) §5880. 
3 The section has not been adopted in North Dakota or Kansas. California has 
adopted a substitute, omitting any reference to restrictions. Cal. Corp. Code Ann. 
(Deering, 1953) §2479. 
4 For a general review of cases prior to 1951, see 29 A.L.R. (2d) 901 (1951). 
5 Baumohl v. Goldstein, 95 N.J. Eq. 597, 124 A. 118 (1924); Doss v. Yingling, 95 Ind. 
App. 494, 172 N.'E. 801 (1930). 
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were corporate officers, restrictions were held valid on the theory that 
the officers owed a semi-fiduciary duty to the corporation and should 
not be allowed to take advantage of the statute since they were in a posi-
tion to see that the restriction was stated on the certificate. Some of the 
more recent decisions, 6 however, though perhaps distinguishable from 
the early cases, have taken a strict view of the statute and held that actual 
knowledge of the restriction makes no difference if the statement is not 
printed on the certificate. The principal case follows this trend, and, as 
the statute is worded, proper principles of statutory construction suggest 
no other result.7 
Despite the fact that section 15 fulfills the commissioners' purpose 
of making certificates of stock "so far as possible the sole representatives 
of the shares which they represent,"8 it perhaps fails to take account of 
certain practical considerations. Restrictions on sale of stock are found 
most often in small closely held corporations where stockholders are more 
than likely to be aware of the restrictions. Thus, the statute, as interpreted 
by the majority of courts, often applies where it serves no purpose of 
giving notice, but only contravenes the considerations which have sup-
ported restraints on alienation of stock, such as preserving the personal 
element and resulting close control of the corporation. Reasonable restraints 
seem therefore justified to help maintain this relationship.9 Where the 
restraint stems from an agreement solely between the stockholders, the 
likelihood is great that, as a practical matter, the statutory requirements 
will be overlooked, and yet, the statute would still seem to apply to in-
validate the restraint.10 While the problem is alleviated to a degree by 
the "semi-fiduciary" exception when fOrporate officers are involved in 
the transfer, at least one case has not seen fit to make this exception.11 
It is admitted that a less strict requirement would introduce problems of 
proof of actual knowledge, but the difficulties would seem to be justified 
since the inequities which may result from application of the strict view 
would be avoided. 
In addition, the wisdom of applying the same strict rule to restric-
6 See, e.g., Costello v. Farrell, 234 Minn. 453, 48 N.W. (2d) 557 (1951); Security Life 
and Accident Ins. Co. v. Carlovitz, 251 Ala. 508, 38 S. (2d) 274 (1949); Age Publishing 
Co. v. Becker, 110 Colo. 319, 134 P. (2d) 205 (1943). 
7 For an excellent interpretative analysis of §15, see Costello v. Farrell, note 6 supra, 
noted in 36 MINN. L. REv. 269 (1952). 
8 Commissioners' Note to §15, 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 20 (1922). 
9 For analysis of validity of such restrictions and reasons for enforcing them, see 
Cataldo, "Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporation," 37 VA. L. REv. 229 
(1951); 25 IND. L. J. 56 (1949); and IO UNIV. FLA. L. REv. 54 (1957). 
10 This conclusion is based on the "or otherwise" phrase of the statute, note 2 supra. 
However, in Tomoser v. Kamphausen, 307 N.Y. 797, 121 N.E. (2d) 622 (1954), the court 
distinguished tlie case on this giound and enforced the restriction. 
11 Sorrick v. Consolidated Telephone Co., 340 Mich. 463, 65 N.W. (2d) 713 (1954), 
noted in 8 VAND. L. REv. 640 (1955). 
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tions as is applied to liens12 is questionable for several reasons. First, the 
practical necessity of calling the impediment to the holder's attention 
is less in the case of a restriction. This results from the fact that a lien 
usually affects only certain shares while restrictions generally apply to 
all shares. In addition, a lien is just as likely to attach to a share of a 
large corporation where the stock will probably be transferred without 
personal knowledge of the affairs of the corporation, while, as seen above, 
a. restriction is more likely to be found in a small corporation where 
the probability of actual knowledge is much greater. Second, the combina-
tion of the two provisions in one section has made it unclear whether the 
restriction must be printed on the certificate in its entirety. While the 
phrase, "the right of the corporation," may refer only to the lien provision 
of the section and the original intent may have been to have the restric-
tion on transfer completely spelled out on the certificate, at least two 
courts have held the contrary.13 Moreover, at least one legislature has 
changed section 15 to require only a notice of the restriction,14 and this is 
recommended in the interest of simplicity. 
In the light of the foregoing, it is suggested that consideration be 
given to the following changes in section 15. First, provisions respecting 
restrictions should be placed in a separate section. Second, stating the 
restrictions on the certificate should be required to hold only persons 
without actual knowledge of the restriction. Third, only a reference to 
the restriction should be required, with some provision made for easy 
access to a copy of the restriction. These changes in section 15 would 
reconcile the practical need for restrictions on stock sales in small closely 
held corporations with the policy of the statute to protect innocent pur-
chasers, and, at the same time, make the statute clearer and facilitate com-
pliance with its provisions. 
L. Ronald Modlin 
12 Note 2 supra. 
13 Weissman v. Lincoln Corp., (Fla. 1954) 76 S. (2d) 478 at 483, held the statute should 
read, "the right of the corporation to ... the restriction." In Allen v. Biltmore Tissue 
Corp., 2 N.Y. (2d) 534 at 540, 141 N.E. (2d) 812 (1957), the court reached the same result 
as in Weissman v. Lincoln Corp., while disapproving of its reasoning, by interpreting 
the word "stated," to permit "incorporation by adequate reference." See note 2 supra. 
14 'Minn. Stat. Ann. (1953; Supp. 1956) §302.16. 
